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dealing with wrongful death. But, as pointed out by Professor Siegel,
this is not an area for literal interpretation. 6 It is incongruous not to
adopt the "limited to negligence" language in wrongful death actions
where the plaintiff is also suing for personal injuries; the claims can be
joined and, if the death is traceable to the injury, liability "would rest
on the same foundation that supports the liability for the personal in87
jury.,
ARTICLE

32-

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3212: Summary judgment granted despite plaintiffs failure to
allege freedom from contributory negligence.
In DePaul v. George,8 plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by
defendant, moved for summary judgment on the ground that defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of his negligence as a result of a prior judgment against him. 9 On appeal from an
order granting summary judgment, defendant contended that plaintiff's
freedom from contributory negligence had been neither alleged nor
proved in the lower court. A majority of the First Department was,
nonetheless, of the opinion that in a passenger versus driver situation,
the driver should be aware of whether his passenger was contributorily
negligent. Thus, the driver, on his own initiative, should come forward
with any evidence regarding plaintiff's misconduct without requiring
the plaintiff "to institute the first movement of a ritualistic dance" 90
by alleging freedom from contributory negligence.
Normally, of course, freedom from contributory negligence is an
intricate part of plaintiff's cause of action which must be pleaded and
proved.9 1 However, appellate courts have generally adopted a permissive attitude toward granting summary judgment where, as in DePaul,
a passenger is suing his host driver. 92 In this instance, plaintiff's conduct
is rarely an actual issue in the case. 93 Thus, although good practice
dictates an exculpatory affidavit by plaintiff, the failure to insert what
is essentially a pro forma allegation should not prejudice his claim.
86 Id.

S7 lId.
88 34 App. Div. 2d 620, 309 N.YS.2d 90 (1st Dep't 1970).
89 Cf. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.YS.2d 596

(1967).
90 34 App. Div. 2d at 620, 309 N.YS.2d at 92.
91Weston v. City of Troy, 139 N.Y. 281, 34 N.E. 780 (1893).
92 See, e.g., Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1960);

see also 4 WK&M

3212.03.

93 See, e.g., Schembri v. Burke, 57 Misc. 2d 703, 293 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. Queens

County 1968); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1968).

